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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
q

!1cl

F OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No. 18993

-v-

JOSFPH LOVATO,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Joseph Lovato, appeals from a conviction
and a judgment of Aggravated Sexual Assault, a first degree
felony,

in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-405 (1953 as

amended) •

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury in Third Judicial
District Court from December 13-15, 1983, Judge Leary
presiding.

He was found guilty of Aggravated sexual Assault,

a first degree felony,

and sentenced to a term of not less

than five years to life in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks af firmance of the verdict and
JUliyment of guilty of Aggravated sexual Assault.

STATEMFNT OF FAC'TS
Carmelita Romero,

the lH yt·ar old victim, mrJVPc1

Pocatello, Idaho to Salt Lake City in search of employment
oecemter of 1981.

Nils Swenson, a

long-time friend of

allowed her to stay at his apartment
looked for work.

,,

hC>r"

rent-free while she

Mr. Swenson worked in the oil

Wyoming and was out of town most of the time (T.
in town, Swenson resided at the Miles Hotel

fields nf
110).

When

because he was

almost 60 years old and had no desire to share an apartment
with female teenager (T. 121).
On January 17, 1982, at approximately 1:30 a.m.,
Carmelito's cousin Julia

brought a group of her friends over

to meet Carmelita; appellant

was among the group (T.

The vistors departed around 3:00 a.m.
them she had to work the next morning.

202).

because Carmelita told
After everyone left,

Carmelita set her alarm and went to bed wearing a pair of tJlue
sweat pants, a "Highland Rams"

jersey shirt and her panties

(T. 10).
About ten minutes later, she heard a knock on the
door.
alone.

She opened the door to find appellant standing there
Appellant asked Carmelita if he could come in and use

her phone to get a ride home (T. 11).
hesitant,

Carmelita

was

but reluctantly al lowed him to use the phone h2cause

he was her cousin's friend

(T.

47-48).

Appellant went

int"

Carmelito's tedroom and made two phone calls while Carmel1tu
remained in the living room.

After he called, Carmelitu asked
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appellant
111.

to leave because she had to work in the morning

Appellant asked

(T.

if he could wait inside, Carmelito

that he wait outside on the corner where it was
lighted and his ride could more easily find him (T. 12).
Appellant complained that
remain inside.

it was cold outside and preferred to

Once again, she asked him to leave (T. 12).

At this point, appellant said he didn't want to leave and
grabbed her by the throat.
but appellant shut it.
a white,

She then realized appellant had pulled

pearl-handled pocket knife out and put it to her head

and throat.
refused,

Carmelito reached for the door,

Appellant then told her he wanted sex and,

he would "cut

[her]

cunt."

(T. 16).

if she

Carmelito was

frightened and pleaded with appellant not to hurt her (T. 16).
While Carmelito struggled to escape,
into the

appellant dragged her

bedroom, and threw her on the bed.

Carmelito jumped

off, but then appellant threw her against the wall and floor.
In the process her neck and lip were bruised (T. 90, 169-170).
As the struggle continued, appellant held the knife to her
throat and told her to take off her clothes, but Camelito
refused.

Appellant grabbed a towel, placed it around her

throat and attempted to choke her: however, Carmelito managed
to pull the towel away from him (T. 19).
struggle, appellant

However, during this

pulled Carmelito's sweat pants down and

forced her to have sexual intercourse.

Appellant also forced

Carmelito to sutrnit to cunnilingus and to perform fellatio
64-65).
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(T.

After the

intercourse occurrerl,

rnrmelito

telling appellant that her "father" was going to be homP
around 6:00 a.m.

She told appellant

that Nils Swenson,

lessee of the apartment, was her father

tht,

(although he is notl

and that she must call him because he had to go to work anr1
might have overslept (T. 22).
appellant dozed on the bed.

She telephoned Swenson whilP
As appellant slept, Carmelito

whispered into the phone "come over here right away."

( T. 24 1.

It took Nils Swenson about 20 mintues to arrive,

As

he walked to the door he not iced a note being helcl up to the
window from inside the apartment.
please."

It said,"Call a cop,

Carmelito had written the note after calling Nils

and held it to the window {T. 25).

Nils went to a pay phone

on the corner, called the police, and waited for their arrival
{T. 27-28; 112-113).
Carmelito remained in the apartment until the police
arrived.

While waiting, she went

a knife out of the drawer.

into the kitchen and grabb=d

She was going to enter the bedroom

and stab appellant as he lay asleep on the bed.
changed her mind and put the knife back,
would go to prison i f she stabb;,d him (T.

Carmelito

believing that she
28).

As she put the

knife away, the police arrived and she ran out the door (T.
28).
She approached Nils and the officers, told them she
had reen raped and that appellant was inside, armed with a
knife {T. 29).

Nils described her as hysterical and in tears

-4-

as he tried to confort her as the officers approached the home
to

apprehend appellant (T. 114-115).
The officers approached the front door, which was

partially open (T. 128).

They could see part of the

appellant, lying face down, asleep on the bed (T. 128).

They

quietly approached appellant and, after a struggle, cuffed him
and told him he had been accused of raping Carmelita.

They

read him his rights and asked if he would care to give his
side of the story.

Appellant denied having intercourse, he

stated he was just visiting Carmelita (T. 129).

He was

searched, and a small pocket knife was seized (T. 130-131).
At this point, appellant was placed under arrest for
aggravated sexual assault (T. 131).
Carmelita was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for an
examination,

The examining physician, Dr. Atkinson, noted

signs to trauma, specifically a bruised lip and red marks on
her neck (T. 90-92). No semen was found in the vaginal
specimen taken; however,

semen was found in her panties (T.

158-159).
While at the hospital, Carmelita was interviewed by
Gae Duersch, a long-time volunteer from the Rape Crisis
Center. Carmelita appeared "uptight" and had a red mark on her
neck (T. 167-169).

As they talked, Carmelita was visibly

upset and weeped (T. 167).

During this interview, Carmelita

recalled the details of appellant's attack and answered
personal questions,

including the date of her last intercourse

which the Rape Crisis volunteer recorded as January 15, 1981.
(The date actually was January 15, 1982.

-5-

It appears that the

incorrect year was recorded.

Thus, hc>r last <'<insenual sexuziJ

intercourse was within 48 hours of the rat'e).
At trial, appellant chose to testify (T.
changed his story and admitted having sexual
209).

2111).

H'

intercourse (T.

Appellant testified that he talked with Carmelito aftn

calling his aunt for a ride home.

Carmelita told him that st,"

was pregnant and that her boyfriend had left her and she was
worried about her future (T.208).
the bathroom.

When she returned, she was wearing only her

white jersey and her panties.
They then went

She then got up and went to

into the

She asked him to go to becl.

bedroom and engaged in consenual

sexual intercourse (I. 209).

Appellant's theory at trial was

that Carmelito fabricated the rape in order to obtain an
abortion and medication for venereal disease, which she
allegedly suffered from.

Appellant admitted he possessed a

knife that night (T.

204).

203,

He testified that he used the

knife to clean his nails that evening as the group socialized
with Carmelito.
After all the evidence was presented and the
arguments were heard, the jury convicted appellant of
aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-405 (1953 as amended}.

He was sentenced to an

indeterminent sentence of five years to life in the Utah statP
Prison.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF THE DATE OF
THE COMPLAINT'S LAST SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
WAS PROPER.
A.

THE DATE OF THE VICTIM'S LAST SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE rs IRRELEVANT TO THE
ISSUE OF CONSENT.

Appellant asserts that the date of Carmelito's last
sexual intercourse, as documented by the Rape Crisis
counselor, should have been admitted to show that she had
consented to sexual intercourse within forty-eight hours of
the alleged rape.

He claims that this evidence would have

bolstered his theory that carmelito believed that she was both
pregnant and suffering from venereal disease and therefore
consented to intercourse with appellant in order to obtain an
abortion and medication for the venereal disease by claiming
that appellant had raped her.

(Brief for Appellant at 9).

The focal point of the trial was the issue of
consent.

Appellant admitted his return to the apartment after

everyone had left.

He admitted having the pocket knife which

the victim described in his possession that evening and even
admitted having the knife open to clean his nails earlier in
the evening.

Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse

with Carmelita but denied that he used his knife to force her
to submit to intercourse.

-7-

Appellant's attempt to admit into ev1<ience the dat'"
of Carmelita's last consenual intercourse presents the

issue

of whether past specific acts of sexual intercourse by the
prosecutrix may be admitted to show consent where the
defendant admits sexual intercouse occurred.

Inquiry into

past spcific acts of intercourse with individuals other thcin
the defendant is irrelevant, highly prejudicial and would
further deter victims from reporting rapes or other violent
sexual assaults.
The inappropriateness of inquiry into the victim's
past sexual experience has long been recognized.

Courts have

been troubled with finding the proper balance between the
defendant's right to confront his accuser and senseless
interrogation of a rape victim.
In Utah, the case law regarding interrogation of a
rape victim was originally set forth in State v. Scott, 55
Utah 553, 188 P. 800 ( 1920):
Where the defendants admits the
sexual act, but contends that the
prosecutrix consented thereto, and where
as here, she is of lawful age, such
evidence (general reputation for chastity
or prosecutrix) is relevant and material
upon the question of consent.
188 P. 864.

[However], the authorities are very
numberous, indeed the great weight of
authority is to the effect, that the
prosecutrix cannot be interrogated on
cross-examination as to whether she had
had sexual intercourse with others than
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the defendant.
The doctrine is rosed upon
the fact, and the great weight of
authority is to the effect, that specific
acts of intercourse with others than the
defendant may not be shown.
If it is
desired to prove that the prosecutrix is a
lewd woman, that may only be done by
attacking her general reputation for
chastity and morality, and not by showing
specific acts of wrongdoing . • . .
(emphasis added)
This principle of limiting inquiry into the victim's general
reputation for chastity and honesty was reaffirmed in State v.
Smith, Utah,

62 P.2d 1110 (1936).

In Smith, the Court

explained the logic behind excluding the victim's past
isolated instances of intercourse with individualsd other than
the defendant.
In cases of rape where the
prosecutrix is over the age of consent,
her bad reputation for chastity is a
proper matter for consideration of the
jury as affecting her credibility and
bearing on the probability of consent.
State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 Pac 818;
1 Wharton's Crim. Evid. 481 • • • In some
jurisdicition the courts hold that the
prosecuting witness may be examined as to
previous cts of immorality on her part as
affecting her credibility as a witness
[cites omitted].
There are grounds for
distinction between examination of a
prosecutrix as to previous conduct showing
her to be a common prostitute and merely
as to isolated acts of intercourse.
The
former conduct would indicate a low state
of morals and affect credibility as a
witness, while isolated acts might have no
such bearing.
[cite omitted.] [emphasis
added J
The principle of excluding past specific acts of
intercourse is still followed by this Court.
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In State v.

Howard, Utah 544 P.2d 466 ( l'l75) this Court

recr>qnized that

many rape offenses go unreported due t" the "embarrassment dr,,
humilation" that the victim must go through at trial.

The

Court observed further that all women, regardless of their
moral character' deserve to be free from forcible violation rrf
their body,

Supra at 469.

In an effort to minimize the

intrusion into the victim's personal life, the Court followed
the majority rule: that it is improper for the trial judge t 0
permit inquiry into specific acts of prior misconduct of the
victim.

unless it reasonably appears such evidence would have

sufficient probative value to outweigh any detrimental effect.
Supra at 469.
To determine the probative value of the evidence,
the Howard court found it helpful to distinguish

between two

types of factual situation in such "consent" cases.

First, if

there was an unwelcomed intrusion, by force or "some form of
trick or deception" then whatever slight probative value the
victim's past specific acts of intercourse might have on the
issue of consent it is greatly outweighed by the prejudice
against the victim.

Second, under the circumstances where the

parties meet consenually and then the atmosphere changes to
violence, then the probative value may be found to outwe1ght
the prejudicial value of admitting prior act of intercourse
Id. at 470.

rn the instant case appellant returned to

Carmelito's apartment after everyone had been told to leave.
He gained admitance under the guise of needing a ride home.
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Thus, he deceived Carmelita into allowing him in.
Carmelita's apartment,

appellant's use of force and threats of

f,irce coerced Carmel i to
under these facts,

Once inside

into having intercourse with him.

the Howard test indicates that the

protative value of the victim's last intercourse is not
sufficient to outweigh the prejudicial effect of such
ev ide nee.
Later in State v. Johns, Utah, 615 P.2d 1260 (1980)
this Court established the current standard for admitting
evidence of a rape victim's past promiscuity.

In Johns, the

victim was giving the drunken defendant a ride home when he
pulled a knife, put it to her throat and demanded she stop the
car.

Once the car was stopped, the defendant forcibly

sodomized and raped her.
but claimed consent.

The defendant admitted intercourse,

This Court concluded that evidence of

the victim's past sexual relations was properly excluded.

The

Court then stated that such evidence should not be admitted
unless the "probative value outweighs the inherent danger of
unfair prejudice to the prosecutrix."

615 P.2d at 1264.

In

balancing these competing considerations, the court explained
that trial

judges should consider various factors,

including;

(a) relevancy and probative value; (b) prejudical effect; (c)
confusion of the issues and undue consumption of time; and (d)
substantial justice.

615 P.2d at 1263.

The ruling of the

trial court as to these factors will not be reversed on review
unless an abuse of discretion is proved.
considering these factors

Id.

After

in Johns, the Court concluded that

"specific evidence
-11-

o" the prosecut ix' s prior sexua 1 cict iv i ty is not
the issue of her consent or any nt hr>r material
126 4.

relevant

to

issLH."

In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed

particular circumstances of the case, noting that the
defendant did not know the victim prior to the incident

n,c-

Court also stressed that the defendant admitted he drew a
knife, but denied holding it to the victim's throat, and also
admitted engaging in sodomy and sexual intercourse.

Under

these circumstances, the Johns court concluded that spec1f 1 c
acts of past consensual intercourse with another had no
bearing on consent in this instance.

Id.

The factors which led to the exclusion of the
evidence in Johns are all present

in the instant case as well.

Here, appellant had never met Carmelito prior to the evening
that he sexually assaulted her.

Like the defendant

in Johns,

appellant admitted having his knife out that night but claimed
he only used it to clean his nails.

Appellant a 1 so admitted

engaging in sodomy and sexual intercourse.

Just as this Coun

concluded in Johns, Carmelita's past sexual activity with
other men has absolutely no bearing on whether she consented
to sexual act on this particular occasion with appellant, who
was a total stranger.

See State v. Geer, 13 wash. App. 71,

533 P.2d 389, 391-92 ( 1975).

The appropriateness of excluding evidence of
Carmelita's last intercourse is apparent when the factors
specified in Johns are examined.
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First,

the evidence lacked

relevance and prol:Etive value.

As noted in Johns, "[t]he fact

tl:at a woman consented to sexual intercourse on one occasion
is not

substantial evidence that she consented on another.

" 615 P.2d at 1263 (quoting State ex. rel Pope v. Superior
Court, 113 Ariz.

22,

545 P.2d 946 (1976)).

Accordingly,

in

the instant case, the victim's previous act of sexual
intercourse with others "has little if any relevancy to the
question of her consent in the situation involved here."
Johns, 615 P.2d at 1263 (footnote omitted).

At trial,

appellant conceeded that coitus occurred; therefore,

there was

no need to admit evidence of Carmelito's last intercourse to
explain the presence of semen.

The only purpose served by

admitting such evidence was to inflame the jury and possibly
acquit the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence of
guilt.

State v. Geer, 533 P.2d 389.

Even if relevant, the

prol:Etive value of her previous acts of intercourse was so
slight as to warrant exclusion in the trial judge's
discretion.

The appellant contends this information was

nee es sa ry to prove to the jury that Carmel i to thought herself
pregnant and, therefore, framed the appellant in order to
obtain an abortion and treatment for the venereal disease that
she allegedly suffered from.

Yet the topic of Carmelito's

possible pregnancy and the motive to lie were discussed
throughout the trial (T. 70, 80, 146-147, 208).

Judge Leary

properly limited inquiry into Carmelito's past sexual
activities because such evidence had little or no probative
value given the already thorough
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presentation of appellant's theory.

Leary µroµerly

excluded this evidence which lacked relevance and µrol:Btive
value.
Second, the evidence would have been highly
prejudicial.

Johns, supra.

Appellant sought to combine the

date of Carmelita's last intercourse with the allegation of
pregnancy and the presence of a loathsome social disease to
portray the victim as a harlot.

The prejudicial nature of

this line of questioning is clear.

Even if appellant's

unfounded acquisations were true, this line of inquiry is
improper.

As noted in Howard, even the most morally bankrupt

woman deserves protection from forcible violation of her body.
544 P.2d at 469.

Appellant presented testimony of the

possibility of Carmelita being pregnant, there was no need to
put her on trial and further humilate her.
Third, admitting evidence of Carmelita's past sexual
activity would have needlessly confused the issue and resulted
in unnecessary delay.

Even one question concerning her last

intercourse would have confused the jury.

While appellant

claimed that only one or two questions would be asked, it is
clear that the examination would not end there.

The state

would then be forced to present evidence to rebut appellant's
character attack.

This would have placed Carmelita on trial,

confusing and inflaming the jury while disorting attention
away from the innocence or guilt of the individual actually on
trial.

-14-

Fourth,
nf violent

without

if substantial

justice is to be done victims

sex crimes must feel free to report the crime

fear of unwarranted harrassment and senseless

pulication of the most private aspect of their lives.
Appellant

suffered no hardship by excluding this evidence;

he

was able to testify that Carmelito said she was pregnant and
unsure of what to do.

Substantial

justice would not

be

by placing the victim on trial.
As in Johns, the appellant met the victim for the
first time, admits the possession of a knife and admits
intercourse.

Under these facts, consenual intercourse on

other occasions with men other than the defendant is
irrelevant

to consent

in this situation.

Even if relevance is

found,

the evidence is not probative given the other evidence

in the

record.

Clearly whatever slight benefit this evidence

may have had for the appellant, the harm to the victim clearly
outweighs the speculative benefit to the defendant.

Johns,

supra.
Although decided before Johns, this Court held that
it was proper to forbid the defendant from questioning the
prosecutrix about her pregnancy and abortion, where the
defendant argued that the rape was fabricated as a
justification for the abortion.
554 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1976).

See State v. Van Dam, Utah,

There, the Court noted that it is

"elementary that the trial court has wide discretion as to the
extent of

(cross]

examination."
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Id. at 1326.

In Van Dam, the

fact of the victim's pregnancy at
established.

thP

t

im<> nf

u,,,

rape was

The jury was also informed that the victim

obtained an abortion after the rare occurred.Beyond that, thP
court reasoned, the history of the pregnancy was no part of
the incident or crime, but was "a fishing trip where the trir
was unnecessary and impertinent •

Id.

The jury was

informed of the motive to fabricate the rape but did not
believe the defendant's scenario.

The court concluded the

defendants argument was without merit.
In the instance case, appellant's argument is
equally without merit.

The jury was apprised of the

possibility that Carmelita was pregnant and in need of an
abcrtion (T. 70, 80, 146-147, 208).

The jury was also

informed that Carmelita was in fact given the mandatory
medication administered to all rape victims which induces an
abcrtion and protects against venereal disease (T. 102).

The

jury was fully aware of appellant's contention that the victim
was perhaps fabricating the rape as a pretense for obtaining
an abort ion.
argument.

The jury choose not to believe appellant's

Going into the details of the intercourse which led

Carmelita to

believe that she was pregnant

irrelevant and immaterial.

Moreover,

it is unlikely the

information would have aided appellant; the
occurred just two days before the rape.
justifiably, would find

woulrl have been

intercourse

The jury,

it doubtful that anyone would be so

certain of their pregnancy after only two days.
As in Van Dam, the appellant
victim's motive to lie.

brought out the

There was no need to delve into
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details that would only inf lame the jury, confuse the issue
anrl possibly result in grave injustice.

Judge Leary properly

Pxercised his rliscretion in limiting the scope of cross
examination.
Other jurisdictions have dealt with the
admissability of past specific acts of intercourse by the
victim.

People v. Martinez, Colo., 634 P.2d 26, 31 (1981);

State v. Jones, Hawaii, 617 P.2d 1214 (1980);

Interest of

Nichols, Kan, App., 580 P.2d 1370 (1978); State v. Ryan, New
Jersey,

384 A.2d 570 (1978); State v. Cosden, Wash. App., 568

P.2d 802 (1977); Pack v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977).
From a review of the cases, there appears to be a consensus
that evidence of past specific acts of intercourse are
adrnissably only when the defendant denies having sexual
intercourse yet semen is found in or around the victim's
vagina.
the

If semen is found,

then the defendant needs to inform

jury that the complainant had sexual intercourse recently

in order to explain the presence of semen when he denies
intercourse occurred.

Where the defendant admits intercourse,

there is no dispute as to who depositied the semen.

In this

case appellant admits intercourse; had he denied it, he would
have perhaps teen entitled to adrni t evidence which suggests
that another deposited the semen.

Such is not the case here.

The appellant sought to elicit the date of Carmelito's last
conse nua 1 intercourse, combine it with the allegations of
pregnancy and venereal disease to make Carmelita appear to be
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a lewd woman, not to offer an explanation of whu depos1tiec1
the semen.
In People v. Martinez, supra, the Colorado SupremcCourt concluded that evidence of a prior sexual act with
another that could explain the presence of semen in the
victim's vagina was admissable where the defendant claimecl no
sexual intercourse occurred.

The Colorado court noted in

footnote that had consent been claimed the evidence would have
been excluded under Colorado's "rape shield" statute which
precludes inquiry into post specific acts of intercourse, as
does Utah case law.

634 P.2d at 31 n. 7.

Thus, the Colorado

court recognized the limited circumstances where prior sexual
intercourse has protative value -- where such information is
need to explain the presence of seminal fluid when the
defendant claims that he never had intercourse with the
prosecutrix.
In State v. Jones, Hawaii, lil7 P.2d 1201 (1980), the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that,

in a prosecution for

forcible rape and sodomy, evidence that the prosecutrix
consented to intercourse with another man within forty-eight
hours of the alleged rape was irrelevant and not probative of
the issue of consent where the defendant admits intercourse.
The Jones court further noted that had the defendant denied
intercourse and offered the evidence to refute the source of
the semen then a different result might have been reached.
617 P.2d at 1220-1221.

-18-

Similarly,

the Kansas Court of Appeals held that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence
thdt

the prosecutrix had sexual intercouse shortly before the

incident.

In re Nichols, 580 P.2d at 1374.

The court

reasoned that because the defendant admitted intercourse,
showing trat the semen came from another source would have no
relevance.

Cf. 580 P.2d at 1374.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar

result in State v. Ryan, New Jersey,

384 A.2d 570 (1978).

The

court held that evidence showing that the complainant had
sexual intercourse the night before the alleged rape was of
such low probative value that it was within the discretion of
the trial judge to exclude the evidence.

384 A. 2d 570.

In

Ryan, the defendant. admitted intercourse, but claimed consent.
The court discounted the logically flawed notion that consent
on one occasion with another person creates an inference of
consent

in another instance.
The court of Appeals of Washington has also

addressed the issue of the admissability of specific act of
intercourse which the victim engaged in shortly before the
alleged rape.
( 1977).

State v. Cosden, Wash. App., 568 P.2d 802

The court concluded that if the defendant denies

sexual contact, yet the post rape examination shows evidence
of recent sexual contact, then all recent partners which could
account for those test results become relevant and admissable
within the trial court's discretion.
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The court found it

unfair to deprive the defendant of the oprorturiity to show Hie
test results were not inconsistent with his denial of
intercourse.

Id at 80n.

The court held, however, that th,,

trial court did not abuse its discrtion in excluding the
evidence t::ecause the proretive value of the evidence was weaf
and unpersuasive in light of the overwhelming evidence of thf'
defendant's guilt.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that evidence of
recent sexual intercourse is admissable if combined with
medical evidence that sperm could live for the period t€tween
sex and the time of the postrape examination, if such evidence
would tend to prove that the semen present resulted from an
earlier consenual sexual relationship.
571 P.2d 241, 245 (1977).

Again,

Pack v. State, Wyo.,

this evidence would only be

helpful where the defendant denies any sexual contact.
245.

Id.

The source of the semen is not at issue where the

defendant concedes that coitus occurred; the only issue
remaining is whether the coitus t::etween the defendant and the
prosecutrix was consenual.
Appellant's effort to admit evidence of the
prosecutrix's prior specific sexual contacts runs contrary to
Utah case law and,

indeed, the case law of a majority of other

jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.

Judge Leary did

not abuse his discretion in refusing appellant's attempt to
inflame the jury and divert attention away from the relevant
issue -- whether appellant forced carmelito to have sexual
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intercourse against her will,

B.
THE DATE OF THE VICTIM'S LAST SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE rs IRRFLEVANT TO THE
CREDIBILITY OF HER TESTIMONY.
Appellant also asserts that evidence of Carmelito's
past specifi-: acts of intercourse should have teen admitted in
order to attack her credibility.
In putting forth this assertion, appellant concedes
that the issue of consent and credibility overlap somewhat in
a rape case.

For that reason, Respondent's argument under

Section A of this

Point is applicable here, because the only

attack made on Carmelito's credibility is that she actually
consented to sexual intercourse with the appellant.
It should te noted early on that appellant's
counsel, Brooke Wells, conducted a long and thorough
cross-examination of Carmelito and had ample opportunity to
attack her credibility.

In fact, the transcript contains

fifty-six pages of intense cross-examination of the victim (T.
31-87).

"It is elementary that the trial court has a wide
latitude of discretion as to the extent of
[cross-examination]."

Van Dam, supra; See also, State v.

Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972).

The

longstanding rule has teen that a defendant may attack the
credibility of the prosecutrix by showing evidence that her
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reputation in the community is that of a prostitute,
supra at 865.

However, specific acts involving the

prosecutrix may not be admitted.

1.2_; see also State v.

Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1289, 1291 (1978).

Appellant seeks

to circumvent this rule and delve into specific acts of
intercourse.
In State v. Johns, supra, this Court stated that
"the law does not and should not recognize any connection
between the veracity of a witness and her sexual promiscuity."
615 P.2d at 1264.

The fact that Carmelita engaged in

consenual sexual intercourse before being raped has no
relevancy to the truthfulness of her testimony.
The lack of logical connection between one's sexual
conduct and their ability to truthfully testify was well
explained in State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, Ariz. 545
P. 2d 946 ( 1976).

The court noted that i f the sexual

activities of a rape victim are admissable to impeach her
credibility in a rape prosecution, then her sexual history
would be admissable to impeach her credibility in any case in
which she testified,

Id. at 950.

No jurisdiction has adopted

such a rule.
If Carmelito's past acts of intercourse affected her
credibility, then the appellant was free to admit extrinsic
evidence to show she had a bad reputation for truth and
veracity.

None such extensive evidence was proffered.

Appellant simply sought to inf lame the jury by creating the
appearance that carmelito was a harlot by a single
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act of intercourse, because he was unable to impeach her
through allowable cross-examination.
without merit.

Appellant's argument is

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion

in limiting the cross-examination

to relevant evidence.

C.
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS
ACCUSER WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPINGED BY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
CROSS-EXAM I NATI ON.
Appellant asserts that the trial judge's limitation
on the scope of cross-examination of the prosecutrix violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
415

u.s.

Davis v. Alaska,

308 (1974).
Appellant's argument

is wholly without merit.

The

victim, Carmelita Romero, was present at trial, testified in
open court in the presence of appellant, and was subjected to
thorough cross-examination by appellant's counsel.

The Sixth

Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires only that the defendant be able to
introduce relevant and admissable evidence.

Johns supra; see

also United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir.
1978).

Appellant was permitted to adduce evidence so as to

challenge the victim's assertion that the intercourse was
against her will.

Appellant extensively cross-examined

Carmelito as to any bias or motive she might have had to
fabricate this sexual assault.
argument.

The jury did not accept this

A review of Carmelito's most recent consenual
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intercourse would have added nothin'I relevant.
It is a welll

settled principle of

law that the

extent of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion
of the trial judge.
P.2d 804 (1972).

State v. Anderson,

27 lit ah 2d 27F,,

This discretion will not

4gc,

te interferrecl

by the reviewing court unless there is an abuse of discret
to the actual prejudice of the defendant.
27 Utah 2d 214,

wi'I
10n

State v. Belwood,

494 P.2d 519 (1972).

There was no abuse of discretion here.

Judge Leary

allowed the prosecutrix to te asked whether she told the
defendant she was pregnant

(T.

20).

The

judge also allowed

appellant to testify that Carmelito said she was pregnant and
concerned about her future.

Thus, her motive for fabricating

the rape were clearly before the jury with ample opportunity
for consideration by them during deliberation.
Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).

Cf. State v.

Furthermore,

appellant

has offered no proof of actual prejudice, only unsubstantiated
conjecture.

POINT I I
THE LOSS OF APPELLANT'S KNIFE WAS NOT A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AS A DELIBERATE
SUPPRESSION OR DESTRUCTION OF MATERIAL
EVIDENCE.
Appellant contends that he was denied Due Process
the loss of his pocket knife which occurred after the
preliminary hearing but before the trial.
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Appellant makes

this assertion even though he admits that he had the knife
with him that evening,
clean his nails (T.

but testified that he orly used it to

203,

204).

Appellant

brandished the knife

shortly after reentering Carmelito's apartment (T.
Appellant

told her that he wanted to have sex and if she

refused he would use the knife.

At this point, Carmelito

µleaded with appellant that he not harm her.
into the

15).

She was dragged

bedroom and raped.
United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S.

97 (1976) held that

destruction of evidence violates Due Process when the
prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request for
evidence that is "material," not is the sense of might have
effected the outcome,

but rather "if the omitted evidence

creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."
at 112.

Id.

The good faith of the police officer is not examined

because it

is not relevant.

the defendant.

The focus is on the harm done to

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S.

83 (1963).

In

short,

appellant must prove that the lost evidence is so vital

to the

issue of appellant's guilt or innocence as to

constitute a fundamental unfairness.
544 P.2d 477 (1975).
therefore,

State v. Stewart, Utah,

To prevail, appellant must show,

that the presence of the misplaced knife would have

created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, not otherwise
present, and that the knife was so vital to his case that a
funrlamental

unfairness resulted from proceeding without the

knife present.
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In State v. Nebeker, Utah, f,57 l'.2'1 ll',9

(1983), tee

defendant claimed a denial of Due Process because of the
disassembly of photo arrays.

The defendant argued that the

arrays were prejudicial or exculpatory in that the credihil!ly
of the victim's subsequent

identification of him from a lineo;

would have been weakened if defendant's picture was included
in the first array.
This Court in Nebeker, supra quoted from State v.
Hudspeth, 22 wash. App. 292, 593 P.2d 548
appellant's argument;

(1978)

in rejecting

"The mere possibility that an item of

undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense, or might
have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish
'materiality' in the constitutional sense."

Nebeker, supra at

1363.
Similar to the defendant's argument

in Nebeker,

supra, appellant's claim is based on the mere possibility that
the lost knife might have affected the outcome of his trial.
Appellant merely contends that

because the knife had only a

small dull blade, the admission of the knife would have had a
less frightening and less threatening impact on the jury
(Brief for appellant at 18).

Apparently appellant fails to

realize that any knife, no matter how dull,
weapon when placed against one's throat.

is a dangerous

The sharpness of the

knife is not at issue; the only issue is whether the knife was
used to coerce Carmelito into sutrnitting to sexual
intercourse.

The jury found this to be the case.
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It is
knife would have

incredible to suggest that the presence of the
been helpful to appellant.

knife is less frightening
knife at all would

than a large, sharp knife, then no

be even

requires a fancifull

If a small, dull

better for appellant's case.

It

imagination to conclude that the presence

of the knife would even be "material" to the appllant's
defense.

Agurs, supra at 112.

It requires still greater

mental gymnastics to conclude that the knife was so vital to
the

issue of appellant's guilt or innocence that its loss

would constitute a fundamental unfairness.
479.

Stewart, supra at

There was no showing of actual prejudice to the

appellant, only tenuous speculation of some nebulous benefit.
See Codianna v. Myers, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (1983);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-113 (1978); Brady v.
Maryland,
rnateri al.

373 U.S. 83 ( 1963).
In fact,

The knife was in no way

the absence of the knife probably was

beneficial to the appellant

and thus this argument clearly

lacks merit.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Appellant was convicted of Aggravated sexual Assault
tn violation of Utah Code Ann.
which provides,

76-5-405 (1953 as amended),

in pertinent part,

aggravated sexual assault

if:
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(1)

A

person commits

(a)
In the course of a rape or at temi•ted
rape or focible sodomy or attempteo
forcible sodomy:
(i)
The actor causes serious bodily
injury to the victim; or
(ii) The actor compels subnission to the
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of
kidnapping, death, or serious bodily
injury to t:e inflicted imminently on any
person.
Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient, as a matter of law,
sexual assault.

Appellant does not deny having sexual

intercourse with Carmelito, who,
never met before.
possession.

to convict him of aggravaten

by his own admission, he had

Nor, does he deny he had a knife in his

Therefore, the only issue on appeal is whether

the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant compelled
Carmelito to subnit to sexual intercourse by threats of
serious bodily inJury.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-406 ( 1953 as amended),

provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place without
the victim's consent in either of the following circumstance:
(1) When the actor compels the victim to
subnit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as might
reasonably be expected under the
circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to
subnit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person or
ordinary resolution;
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Applying this standard in State v. Herzog, Utah, 610 P.2d 1287
(1980), this Court stated:
The determination of whether, given the
above legal standard, consent was present
or absent in any given case is factual in
nature, and is thus a matter for
determination by the finder of fact.
This
Court will hence no overturn any
determination in that regard unless there
appears of record such evidence that
reasonable minds could not agree with the
verdict reached.
Id. at 1283.

See also State v. Myers, Utah, 606 P.2d 250

( 1980).
The standard to be applied in insufficient evidence
cases was recently set forth in State v. Petree, Utah, 659
p. 2d 4 4 3 ( 19 8 3) :
[W)e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
at 444; see also State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161,
1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980).
on review, this Court is obligated to accept the
version of the facts which supports the verdict.

State v.

Redford, Utah, 550 P.2d 728 (1976); State v. Howard, Utah, 544
P.2d 466 (1975).

Thus, it is not the function of this Court
-29-

to reassess the credibility of the witnesses.
recognized and well-stated in State v.

Tt1is was

Lamm, supra.

The c"ul 1

stated:
It is the exclusive function of the Jury
to weight the evidence and to determine
the crediblity of the witness, and it is
not within the prerogative of this Court
to substitute its judgment for that of the
fact-finder.
This Court should only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that reasonable men
could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 231.

(emphasis added).

See State v. Simms, Utah, 517

P.2d 1315 (1974).
The evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to
support the jury's verdict.

The evidence shows that appellant

compelled Carmelita to subnit to sexual intercourse by holding
a knife to her throat and threatening her with serious bodily
harm.

These threats were coupled with appellant striking

Carmelita in the mouth and by throwing her around the room
when she resisted.

The appellant's violence and threats of

violence overcame Carmelita's reasonable resistance.
Carmelita was grabbed by the throat when she asked
appellant to leave.

Her testimony was corroborated by the

examining physician and the experienced volunteer from the
Rape Crisis Center who both noticed red marks on her neck
(T. 90-92, 167-169).
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Appellant continued to choke Carmelito as he put the
knife to her throat and told her,

in his vernacular, that he

wa11ted to have intercourse and would cut her vagina if she
refused (T.

16).

He then dragged her into the bedroom ancl

threw her on the bed.

Carmelito jumped off but was repeatedly

thrown around the room and struck in the head and back (T.
19).

As the struggle continued, the knife was lost and

appellant grabbed a towel, and put it around her throat and
attempted to choke her (T. 19).

She managed to pull the towel

away only to find appellant had romoved his pants.

Carmelito

sutmitted to sexual intercourse out of fear for her life (T.
20).
When the police arrived, Carmelito immediately ran
out of the house.

Mike Davis, one of the officers present,

described Carrneli to as "very upset" and "on the verge of
tears.

11

(T. 127).

As the officer enterecl the apartment to

apprehend appellant, Carmelito remained with her friend Nils
Swensen as he tried to calm her.

Mr. Swenson described her as

hysterical and in tears (T. 114).
After appellant was apprehended, the officers
transported Carrnelito to Holy Cross Hospital for a post rape
examination.
trauma.

The post rape examination showed evidence of

In addition to the two red marks on her neck, she

sustained a
See State v.

bruise to her lip during the struggle (T. 90-91).
studham, Utah, 572 P.2d 700, 701 (1977).

The

InJured lip was also observed by the volunteer form the Rape
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Crisis Center (T. 169-170).
The volunteer from the Rape Crisis Center also
noticed signs of emotional injury.
"uptight" (T. 168).
"weepy and upset."

Carmelito

first appeared

As the volunteer counseled her, she grew
(T. 167).

The volunteer, Gal Duersch, said

that it was typical for a rape victim to change their mood
during the conversation, as the rapport

is established betwee 11

the victim and the counselor (T. 167-168).

She further

observed that in her six years as a volunteer at the Rape
Crises Center she found the lack of physical evidence normal,
finding only emotional evidence was the normal situation (T.
171).
At this point, it is clear that sufficient evidence
supports the verdict of guilty of aggravated sexual assault.
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's
veridict establishes that Carmelito subnitted to intercourse
only after making a reasonable effort to resist even though
appellant had threatened to slit her throat (T. 21).

There

was clearly sufficient evidence to find that appellant forced
Carmelito to subnit to sexual intercourse under threats of
death or serious bodily harm.
Moreover, there is nothing inherently improbable
about the victim's testimony.

Appellant's brief merely

pointed out discrepancies in the evidence.
task to resolve such conflicts.
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It is the jury's

The jury observed the

...,itnesses and

judged their credibility. They chose to believe

r·armelito's version of the events.

Her testimony was

substantially corroboI:"ated by Nils Swenson, Officer Davis, Dr.
Atkinson and Gae DueI:"sch.

There was substantial evidence to

suppol:"t the verdict and there is nothing inherently improreble
about her COI:"I:"oborated version of the facts.

Hence, this

Court should not disturb the verdict because the evidence was
clearly sufficient for reasonable minds to conclude that
consent was absent.

Herzog, at l 2A 3.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW.
A.
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
INSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
"CONSENT" AND "AGAINST THE WILL."
Appellant's counsel subTiitted the following
instruction, here labeled "Proposed Instruction A," which was
refused:
Proposed Instruction A
An act of sodomy or sexual intercourse
is without the consent of the victim when
the actor compels the victim to subnit or
participate by force that overcomes such
earnes resistance that her age, strength
of body and mind make it reasonable for
her to do under the cirucmstanes; or by
any threat that would prevent resistance
by a person of ordinary resolution.
Such
force or threats need not be limited to
physical violence but may also include
psychological and emotional stress or a
combination of all three.
Furthermore, it
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it not necessary to show that the \'ic't im
engaged in heroics or subjected hPrself to
great brutality or suffen·d or risked
serious wounds or injuries,
The law recongnizes a
of
factors which should be considered to
determine if a sexual act was performed
with or without the consent of one of the
parties.
One factor is evidence of marks
or bruising on either party reflecting
actualy physical violence.
Another
factor is the opportunity to escape of
whether the victim made an outcry.
These
can be reflected in the time of the of the
incident, the isolated location of the
incident, the possible sources of
assistance in the sexual activity to the
victim and any active participation by the
victim.
Likewise, the ease of assertion
of the forcible accomplishment of the
sexual act with the attendant difficulties
of defending against such an assertion,
and the proneness of the victim to assert
force or violence when she realizes that
her activities are likely to be discovered
may also be considered.
These factors and
any which you may find in the evidence or
lack thereof, can be considered by you in
determining whether or not the victim
consented to the sexual acts alleged to
have occurred. [emphasis added].
The trial court also refused the following
instruction offered by appellant:
Proposed Instruction B
The essential element in rape in the
forcing of intercourse upon a woman
"without her consent" and "against her
will." These terms do not mean the same
thing because such an act might occur in
circumstances which would be "without her
consent" but which would not necessarily
involve overcoming her will and her
resistance, both of which must be proved.
If one of these elements has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty of
rape.
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The jury was instead instructed as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
You are instructed that sexual
intercourse occurs "without consent" under
any one of the following situations:
1.
When the actor canpels the victim to
subnit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnes resistance as might
reasonably be expected under the
circumstances; or
2.
The actor compels the victim to
subnit or participate by and threat that
would prevent resistance by a prson of
ordinary resolution,
INSTRUCTION NO. 14
In determining whether the victim's will
and resistance were overcome, it is
appropriate to consider that this may be
accomplished by either physical force and
violence or by psychological or emotional
stress imposed upon her,or by a
combination of them.
As to the degree of
resistance required:
The victim need do
no more than her age and her strength of
boyd and mind make it reasonable for her
to do under the circumstances to resist.
It is not necessary that it be shown that
she engaged in any heroics or that she
otherwise risked the assailant's brutality
or infliction of serious wounds or
injuries.
Though not mentioned by appellant, the jury also
received the following instruction:
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
Where there is a conflict in the
evidence you should reconcile such
conflict as far as you reasonably can.
But where the conflict cannot be
reconciled, you are the final judges and
must determine from the evidence what the
facts are.
There are no definite rules
governing how you shall determine the
weight or convicing force of any evidence,
or how you shall determine what the fact
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in this case are.
But you should
carefully and conscientiously consider and
compare all of the testimony, and all of
the facts and cirucmstances, which have a
bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are.
Appellant asserts that he was precluded from
presenting his theory of the case by the trial courts failure,
to instruct the jury on the difference tetween "consent" and
"against the will" and what factors the jury may wish to
consider in deciding the issue of consent.
Appellant made a timely objection to the trial
court's refusal (T. 251-252)
proposed instructions.

but was not entitled to the

The jury was adequately instructed as

to the elements of the offense and of the definitions
involved.

Appellant's proposed instructions constituted an

unwarranted judicial comment on the evidence and were properly
refused.
The first paragraph of appellant's instruction,
which has teen included and labeled as "Proposed Instruction
A," is fair summation of the law.

It

is substantially

equivalent to Instruction 14, which was given to the jury.
Instruction 14 closely follows the language of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-406 (1953 as amended), which provides:
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or
sexual abuse is without consent of the
victim under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) When the actor compels the victim
to subnit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as might
reasonably by expected under the
circumstances; or
-36-

(2)
The actor compels the victim to
subnit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of
ordinary resolution;
instruction 14 also states that both physical threats and
psychological coercion can t:e used to overcome the victim's
resistance.

This language is found in State v. Studham, Utah,

572 P.2d 200 (1977).

The gist of Instruction 14 is that

physical violence is not necessary to have the intercourse be
against the victim's will.

The first paragraph of appellant's

proposed instruction, included as "Proposed Instruction A,"
supra, also conveys this statement of the law.
The second paragraph of appellant's Proposed
Instruction

A

is totally unacceptable.

It allegedly "informed

the jury" what factors it "can" take into account in
determining whether Carmelito consented to sexual intercourse.
The second paragraph is nothing more than an attempt to have
the judge argue the defendant's case from the tench.

It

directs the jury to consider the lack of bruising, the
opportunity for escape and the possible advantage to the
victim in consenting to intercourse, all of these "factors"
were amply argued by the appellant; there was no need to have
the judge help in appellant's argument
Judge Leary properly refused this instruction as a
comment of the evidence.

Judicial comments on the evidence

were condemned in State v. sanders, Utah, 496 P.2d 270, 275
(1972) and State v. Schoenfeld, Utah 545 P.2d 193, 197 (1976).
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The jury was instead given Instruct inn 3, su;•ra, which
accuratley stated the law, directiny the jury to "carefully
and conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimc-,ny,
and all of the facts and circumstances which have a

bearing

any issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are."

<)n

Thb

is a proper summation of the law; anything more would be an
improper comment of the evidence.
The second paragraph on Proposed Instruction A also
includes the warning that the charge of rape is easily made
and difficult to defend against.
supra.

see Proposed Instruction A,

This court has held that a defendant

to such an instruction.
702 (1977).

is not entitled

State v. Studham, Utah, 572 P.2d 700,

The Studham decision correctly observed that such

an instruction is not favored

because it is actually a

directive to the jury as to how they should view the evidence.
Id.

JudgP Leary properly refused this instruction.
Appellant also requested an instruction on the

difference between "without her consent" and "against her
will," this instruction has been included here and for the
sake of reference labeled proposed Instruction B, supra.
Studham, supra, states in dicta that the two above phrases are
not of the same meaning.

Id. at 702.

The not ion is that

intercourse could occur without the victim's consent yet not
involve overcoming her will by force or threat.

Id. at 702.

Appellant sought to have an instruction echoing the language
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found

in Studham.

He received an instruction summarizing

ttiis distinction in Instruction 14, supra.

The language in

Instruction 14 parallels the language in Studham.

The

instruction correctly states that either force or threat may
he used to overcome the victim's resistence.

This follows

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953 as amended) and Studham.
P.2d at 702.

572

The remainder of the instruction is directly

from Studham and states the degree of resistance required to
prove ooth "without her consent" and "against her will."
Thus, Instruction 14 fully informed the jury of the meaning of
"intercourse • • • without her consent" as Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-402 (1953 as amended)

defines rape and as explained in

studham, supra.
The jury was properly instructed of the relevant
law,

The appellant's proposed instruction on the factors

relevant

in determing consent were properly refused.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ON THE
LAW OF INCONSISTANT STATEMENTS.
Appellant's counsel subnitted the following

instruction,

here labeled "Proposed Instruction C," which was

refused by judge Leary:
you are instructed that if a witness has
made statements prior to the trial which
are inconsistent with the testimony at
trial, and that at the time of his prior
statements he had adequate opportunity to

-39-

perceive the event or condition his prior
statements narrates, explains, or
describes, you may consider su ct1 prior
statements to l:::e substantive evidence in
this case of the truth of those prior
statements has spoken falsely either at
the trial or on that prior occasion.
The proposed instruction was rightfully rejected.
The topic was covered in both preliminary instruct ions anrl
Instruction 3, supra.

It

is possible that this actual purpose

behind the proposed instruction was to have the judge draw
attention to the alleged inconsistancies in Carmelita's
testimony, thereby leaving the impression with the jury that
the judge thought Carmelito's testimony deserved little
weight.
It is axiomatic that the credibility of witnesses is
a jury question.

The court instructed the jury that they were

to reconcile any conflict in testimony where possible and
decide which testimony is truthful! if the conflict in
testimony cannot be reconciled in Instruction 3, and in the
Preliminary Instructions (R. 49).
necessary.

Proposed Instruction C,

This is all the guidence
if accepted, would have

amounted to a judicial attack on the victim's credibility in
the guise of a jury instruction.
Appellant's assertion that an instruction was
necessary to inform thejury that past inconsistent statements
could be considered as substantive evidence is without merit.
The

jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence; the)

were free to believe any inconsistent statements that defense
counsel may have brought out to impeach Carmelito.
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The

preliminary and final

instructions conveyed to the jurors the

iml"'rtance of carefully analyzing all of the evidence in
111q

what was fact rather than fiction.
The general rule is that jury instructions are

c:ons1derer1 as a whole.
(1981).

On review,

State v. Brooks, Utah, 638 P.2d 537

the trial court's ruling will

t:e reversed

only when the failure to give a proposed instruction denies
the defendant of a
P.2d 785 ( 1984).
appellant a

fair trial.

State v. Shabata, Utah, 678

The refused instructions did not deny

fair trial.

Judge Leary's refusal of the proposed

instructions merely eliminated unwarranted judicial comments
on the evidence.

The instructions which Judge Leary gave to

the jury properly conveyed to the jurors the relevant law of
the case without suggesting any favortism towards either the
state or appellant.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding the date of the complainant's last consenual sexual
intercourse.

The rule in Utah has long teen that it is

improper to inquire in past specific acts of intercourse.
Specific acts of intercourse are irrelvant to the issue of
consent

in the instant case and inquiry into past acts of

intercourse is also highly prejudical.

Moreover, this would

only serve to further deter rape victims from reporting rape.
This Court recently held that such inquiry should be forbidden
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unless the prorative value of the evidence outweighs the
unfair prejudice to the prosecutrix.

Johns, supra.

Here,

appellant was not prevented from presenting his theory of
case to the jury.

Inquiry into the date of the intercoursP

would have had little, if any,

prom t ive force.

The loss of the knife did not violate appellant's
due process rights.

Appellant

fails to demonstrate how the

knife was so vital to his case that proceeding without it
resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.

Stewart, supra.

Additionally, there was overwhelming evidence to
support the verdict of guilty of aggravated sexual assault.
Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with Carmelito
and further admitted that he was carrying a knife on the night
of the attack.

Carmelito's testimony that appellant used

force and threats of force was substantially corroborated by
the testimony of the examining physician and the vounteer from
the Rape Crisis Center.

Disinterested third parties noted her

bruised lip and red marks on her neck along with her
distraught demeanor.

The appellant's version, however, was

supported by only his self-interested testimony.
verdict

The jury's

was supported by substantially corroborated evidence

and, therefore, should not be disturbed on appeal.
Finally,

the trial court correctly instructed the

jury as to the applicable law.
instructions constituted

Appellant's proposed

unwarranted judicial comments on the

evidence and were properly refused.
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The instructions given,

1o1iiefl

cnnsidered as a whole, were more than adequate,

pr>J lant

The

is unable to show that the failure to give his

proposed instructions denied him of a fair trial.

The

appellant had a fair trial and was represented by competent
counsel.

His convict ion and sent
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this

should be affirmed.

J's-I day

of August,

19 84 •

DAVID L. WILKINSON

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid to Joan Watt, Attorney
for Appellant, 333 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
day of August, 1984.

